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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing
his successive petition for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed the petition
on the ground that Mr. Cobell's claim of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction
counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a successive petition for postconviction relief. The district court erred.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Cobell's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE

Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Cobell's successive petition for
post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
In this case, the district court identified a sole basis for the summary dismissal of

Mr. Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief: that a claim of ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a
successive petition. Because both the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have
held to the contrary, the district court erred.

This Reply Brief addresses the State's

response that Mr. Cobell's petition was untimely and an improper successive petition.

B.

The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
1.

Timeliness

The State asserts that, because Mr. Cobell's successive petition was filed more
than one year after the issuance of the remittitur in his direct appeal, it was not a timely
petition. The State's argument is flawed for two reasons.
First, the district court did not provide notice that it intended to dismiss on this
ground, and thus, Mr. Cobell was not afforded an opportunity to demonstrate whether
this petition was timely.

The district court articulated a sole basis for dismissing the

petition - that a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was not a
"sufficient reason" for a petitioner to be able to raise or re-raise claims through
successive petitions. (R., pp.27-28.) As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the district
court was incorrect.

Thus, Mr. Cobell was not on notice that he needed to address
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timeliness in order to survive summary dismissal.

And as the State notes, the time

period for filing a petition for post-conviction relief can be expanded if the petitioner can
make a showing that the limitation period should be tolled.
(citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009)).

(Respondent's Brief, p.8

Mr. Cobell was never afforded the

opportunity to address the timeliness of his successive petition, and thus this Court
cannot affirm the district court on this alternate basis.
Second, the deadline for the filing of Mr. Cobell's successive petition was not one
year from the date of the remittitur in his direct appeal. Rather, and as noted by the
State, this Court applies a "reasonable time" standard to determine the timeliness of a
successive petition.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8. (citing Charboneau v. State, 144

Idaho 900, 904 (2007)). The State asserts that, "Cobell does not argue that his claims
were not know to him or could reasonable have been known to him in the requisite timeframe for filing his initial post-conviction petition." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However,
this overlooks the fact that Mr. Cobell asserted that his post-conviction counsel were
ineffective; by definition, this claim could not have been raised in the initial postconviction proceeded; it must be address in a successive petition. And the State has
not asserted that Mr. Cobell's successive petition was not filed within a "reasonable
time" of the dismissal of his first petition.

Thus, the State's argument regarding

timeliness fails.
2.

Successive Petition

The State argues generally that Mr. Cobell's claim was insufficient to withstand
summary dismissal, but never actually defends the district court's sole reason for

4

dismissal. (Respondent's Brief, p.9-12.) Rather, the State miscasts Mr. Cobell's claim
into a different one. The State asserts:
Cobell does not assert on appeal that he had insufficient notice that his
successive petition for post-conviction relief would be summarily
dismissed for failure to show a sufficient reason his claims were not raised
in his initial petition, instead he argues he is entitled to relief because the
district court misstated the law. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Cobell's
position appears to be all that is required to avoid summary dismissal of a
successive petition for post-conviction relief is the mere statement that
post-conviction counsel was ineffective. (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.)
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The State is correct that Mr. Cobell did not assert that he
received insufficient notice of the reason that his petition would be dismissed. However,
Mr. Cobell was not on notice that his petition would be "summarily dismissed for failure
to show a sufficient reason his claims were not raised in his petition," as the State
asserts.

The district court clearly gave notice for the reason it was dismissing the

petition - that Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. App. 1995), provided that, "there is
no right to post-conviction counsel, [and] a petition based on ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel is without merit." (R., pp.27-28.) The district court could not have
been clearer:, "the petitioner's sole argument that his claims were not adequately
raised in his initial post conviction petition is that his post-conviction counsel was
ineffective."
The State then miscasts Mr. Cobell's argument as, "Cobell's position appears to
be all that is required to avoid summary dismissal of a successive petition for postconviction relief is the mere statement that post-conviction counsel was ineffective."
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.)

This is not Mr. Cobell's position.

Rather, Mr. Cobell's

position is that the sole basis for the dismissal in this case was error.

Mr. Cobell

appealed the only adverse ruling that the district court made - that Fol/inus precluded
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the filing of a successive petition. Again, the State makes no argument that this is a
correct statement of the law. Rather, the State asks this Court to envision a scenario
where the district court actually gave a correct reason to dismiss the petition and then
argue that, because Mr. Cobell did not assert that that reason was error, his petition
was summarily dismissed. What the State is really asking this Court to do is affirm on
an alternative theory upon which the district court did not give notice.
Mr. Cobell did not have notice, as the State asserts, that his petition would be
dismissed generally for failure to show why his claims were not addressed in the initial
petition. The district court noted that Mr. Cobell's sole reason for bringing the petition
was a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel and that his claim failed
as a matter of law pursuant to Follinus. This was error. The district court did not put
Mr. Cobell on notice that his assertion was inadequate to survive summarily dismissal it held that the allegation itself could never justify such a petition. Because the district
court did not put Mr. Cobell on notice that he did not sufficiently allege a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, affirming on this basis would be error because the
court never gave Mr. Cobell an opportunity to rebut such a claim. The order summarily
dismissing the petition must therefore be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cobell requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 2 nd day of October, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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